The Lane Myers Experience suffered a significant setback on Monday as Judge D. Douglas Metcalf denied three sets of motions by Myers’ attorney William Parvin and ruled that Myers must remain in jail until his next motions hearing on May 5, 2025.
Myers’ day got off to a troubling start as friend and supporter Mark Brown’s motion to audio and video record the hearing scheduled for 3PM local time was denied by Judge Metcalf.
According to our on-scene reporter, Brown and two other supporters of Lane Myers got into an altercation with security as they were not allowed to record the pre-hearing activities within the courtroom.
Once the hearing was in session, Brown argued that while Pima County provides audio livestreaming in Judge Metcalf’s court, the audio coverage is not sufficient to provide coverage as the lack of video eliminates key moments within the court.
As an example, Brown cited of part of a recent hearing where Judge Metcalf said that Myers was staring him down and trying to intimidate him. Those listening to the audio at home were unable to see the confrontation within the courtroom were not able to actually see what was going on and did not get a true representation of what happened.
With his filing, Brown argued that he’s had previous rulings in his favor in other courts and that if Judge Metcalf ruled in his favor, “All this could go away” and he could go home as others provided video footage of the proceedings.
Metcalf responded by denying the motion, stating that anything that happens in regard to audio and video recording within his courtroom was under his control. While Arizona does have a statute that allows citizens to audio record within courtrooms, that ability is governed by the court, each judge can rescind that ability.
In this case, Metcalf then ruled that recording within the courtroom is disruptive and that recordings would be limited to the public feed provided on the Pima County website. He further stated that if Brown wanted to see video of events, he could attend the hearing in person as the public is allowed to attend the proceedings in person.
Following the ruling, Brown and Myers’ supporters left the courtroom and would not return for the second hearing.
It was more bad news for Myers in the second hearing, as attorney Parvin’s motion to dismiss the aggravated harassment charges in the second set of charges Myers is facing was also denied by Judge Metcalf.
Parvin had argued that the current version of the law governing aggravated harassment is in the process of being revived to address deficiencies and it was unfair to apply the current law to Myers. The attorney asked Judge Metcalf to rule that the current law is unconstitutional and needed to be suspended until the Arizona House could revise the law.
Prosecutor Rachel Stiles countered that the current law was what they needed to work with and that a change to the law may come in the future, but that cannot govern the present as the changes Parvin was looking for were not guaranteed.
Judge Metcalf agreed with Stiles, ruling against Parvin’s motion. Following the ruling, Parvin announced that he would essentially be appealing Metcalf’s ruling. He boasted that his primary field was in appeals cases and that this would be a good case to be taken up by a higher court.
Parvin was also unsuccessful in having the state’s stalking and harassment claims from the second set of charges consolidated into the first set of charges. The attorney attempted to argue that when Myers was released after being arraigned on the first set of charges, there was a grace period as the hearing was on a Friday and the minutes of the hearing were not posted until Monday.
He argued that because the minutes of the hearing were not posted, Myers had a weekend to do whatever he liked before the instructions did not start until the minutes were posted. As such, the second set of charges against Myers would then be voided because they fell within the grace period.
Both prosecutor Stiles and the Judge disagreed, arguing that Myers was told by the previous Judge during the hearing that his orders had taken effect immediately and Myers was presented with documentation at the hearing echoing those orders.
Parvin also argued that since Myers’ behavior hadn’t changed and there was no “pause” in that behavior between the first set of charges, the arraignment for those charges, and the second set of charges, all the actions would be covered by that first set of charges. He also argued that Stiles should not have filed multiple counts of those charges.
The Judge disagreed with Parvin’s arguments, reminding Myers did not receive a weekend off from the terms and conditions of his release at his arraignment and new charges were valid as the arraignment “paused” Myers’ actions and he chose to carry on with the behavior.
As far as multiple counts of the stalking and harassment charges, they reflected Myers’ actions, and that Stiles had the right to file multiple counts against Myers to reflect Myers’ actions following his release on bond.
Judge Metcalf also ordered a hearing on May 5, 2025, to determine if Myers would be eligible for a rehearing on bond.
Parvin had argued Myers needed to be released from custody while he appealed Metcalf’s earlier ruling against declaring the aggravated harassment law unconstitutional. Stiles countered that because Myers had picked up new felony charges while out on bond for a previous felony, Arizona’s constitution forbade release in all circumstances.
Judge Metcalf delayed his ruling until he could research his options before the May 5 hearing. He then ordered Myers to remain in custody.
State of Arizona vs. Lane Myers – Defendant's Reply re Aggravated Harassment on Grounds of Vagueness State of Arizona vs. Lane Myers – Proseuction Response to Defenant's Motion to Dismiss Count Six, Stalking, as Multiplicitous to Already Charged Offense State of Arizona vs. Lane Myers – Proseuction Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Multiplicitous Harassment Counts State of Arizona vs. Lane Myers – Proseuction Response to Motion to ismiss Aggravated Harassment Counts on Grounds of Vagueness Overbroad an the First Amendment
