Judge Announces Mixed Victories for DMA and Frauditor Troll as Legal War Continues

Major rulings in the on-going legal war between Christopher “Denver Metro Audits” Cordova and Jonathan “Frauditor Troll” Hudon-Huneault brought  mixed results for both sides as Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi at least temporarily dismissed the counter claims filed by Hudon-Huneault, while also temporarily denying Cordova’s request for attorney’s fees under California’s Anti-SLAPP statue.

At issue here is the Counter Claims filed by Hudon-Huneault last year in response to Cordova’s lawsuit. According to the ruling, Cordova sued on the following claims:  (1) copyright infringement of two copyrighted videos, Another Chad and Belmar Library, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 501; (2) misrepresentation in DMCA counter-notices, in violation of 17 U.S.C § 512(f); and (3) unlawful circumvention of technological measures, in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a). Id. ¶¶ 85-106, 113-123.

Hudon-Huneault then counter sued on grounds of: (1) bad faith misrepresentation in DMCA takedown notices in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), (2) declaratory judgment of non-infringement of copyright, and (3) tortious interference with prospective economic advantage.

The first ruling of the day came with the near simultaneous filings of a move to strike the tortious interference claim by Cordova under California’s anti-SLAPP statute and Hudon-Huneault’s motion to withdraw the same claim.

Also at stake are attorney’s fees that Cordova contends should be granted for violations of the anti-SLAPP statue.

Judge DeMarchi gave Hudon-Huneault a major procedural win by granting his motion to withdraw the counterclaim, without the granting of attorney’s fees. She, however, gave Cordova the ability to file a new motion to seek such fees.

She wrote:

Defendants contend that their withdrawal of the third counterclaim moots Mr. Cordova’s motion to strike that counterclaim, and that as a consequence, Mr. Cordova is not entitled to seek attorneys’ fees and costs as a “prevailing party” under the anti-SLAPP statute. Dkt. No. 62 at 3-4. Mr. Cordova agrees that his motion to strike is moot—i.e., it need not be adjudicated on the merits—but he disagrees that this extinguishes his ability to seek attorneys’ fees and costs under the anti-SLAPP statute. Dkt. No. 63 at 3.

“Under California’s anti-SLAPP statute, a defendant may bring a special motion to strike a cause of action arising from constitutionally protected speech or petitioning activity.” Barry v. State Bar of Cal., 2 Cal.5th 318, 320 (Cal. 2017) (citing Cal. C.C.P. § 425.16(b)(1)). The anti–SLAPP statute is designed to allow the early dismissal of meritless claims aimed at chilling expression through costly, time-consuming litigation. Verizon Delaware, Inc. v. Covad Comms. Co., 377 F.3d 1081, 1090 (9th Cir. 2004). The statute provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorneys’ fees and costs.” Cal. C.C.P. § 425.16(c)(1); see also Plevin v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, No. 11-cv-2359 MEJ, 2013 WL 2153660, at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2013) (“The fee provision of the anti-SLAPP statute applies in federal court.”).

A party that files an anti-SLAPP motion to strike may “prevail” even if the court does not actually grant the motion. Where a party dismisses the challenged claim or lawsuit before the court rules on a pending motion to strike, the mooting of the merits of the motion does not necessarily prevent the movant from recovering attorney fees. See Run the World Inc. v. Jiang, No. 23-cv-03130-AMO, 2025 WL 948059, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2025) (quoting Law Offices of Bruce Altschund v. Wilson, 632 Fed. App’x. 321 (9th Cir. 2015) (unpublished)), appeal dismissed, No. 25-2785, 2025 WL 2158806 (9th Cir. May 30, 2025). “[W]here the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an alleged SLAPP suit while a special motion to strike is pending, the trial court has discretion to determine whether the defendant is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney’s fees under [§ 425.16(c)].” Coltrain v. Shewalter, 66 Cal. App. 4th 94, 107 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).

Here, Mr. Cordova’s motion to strike is moot. While Mr. Cordova is not automatically entitled to prevailing party status simply because defendants voluntarily withdrew their counterclaim after he filed the motion to strike, Mr. Cordova may, if he wishes, file a motion demonstrating his entitlement to an award of fees and costs and the quantum of such fees and costs. The motion must comply with the requirements of the anti-SLAPP statute and other applicable authority, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and this District’s Local Rules.

Cordova prevailed, however, in his attempt to get counts one and two dismissed. Judge DeMarchi again gave the other side means to amend their complaints to address the deficiencies she found in her ruling.

DeMarchi denied the first counter claim, writing:

The Court agrees that the first counterclaim fails to adequately allege any material misrepresentation by Mr. Cordova. Among other defects, defendants’ pleading fails to identify which of Mr. Cordova’s copyrighted works are at issue, which of defendants’ videos are at issue, and what allegedly false statements were made in which takedown notices. See Sosa v. AT&T, No. 25-cv-01310-WHO, 2025 WL 3719229, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2025) (dismissing DMCA claim where “[n]either side addresse[d] what copyrighted material the DMCA Notice identified as being infringed by [plaintiff’s] video” because “what was represented on that Notice is critical to the question of whether there was a knowing misrepresentation under section 512(f)”). To the extent defendants contend they were expressly or impliedly licensed to use all of Mr. Cordova’s copyrighted works, or even the three videos they identify in their opposition, they fail to plead facts plausibly supporting such a contention. Similarly, to the extent defendants contend that Mr. Cordova’s takedown notices falsely asserted defendants’ videos infringed, when they were instead protected by the “fair use” doctrine, defendants do not plausibly allege, as to any specific video, that such video is entitled to fair use protection as a matter of law, or any other facts suggesting Mr. Cordova conceded such protection applied.

She continued:

Second, Mr. Cordova argues that defendants fail to plead facts showing Mr. Cordova had actual knowledge of the falsity of representations in takedown notices he submitted to YouTube. Dkt. No. 64 at 7-9. Defendants respond that they have adequately pled facts from which the Court may plausibly infer that Mr. Cordova made misrepresentations in subjective bad faith. Dkt. No. 79 at 5-8. It is not clear which allegations in the counterclaim defendants believe satisfy this element. They point only to allegations that the Court has already concluded do not sufficiently identify the representations at issue or why they are false. The only other counterclaim allegations regarding Mr. Cordova’s subjective bad faith are entirely conclusory. See Dkt. No. 58 ¶¶ 25, 46. In these circumstances, no plausible inference of subjective bad faith can be drawn from defendants’ pleading.

Third, Mr. Cordova argues that defendants fail to plead facts plausibly showing that defendants were injured as a result of Mr. Cordova’s alleged misrepresentations in DMCA takedown notices. Dkt. No. 64 at 10-12. Defendants argue that they have alleged loss of revenue and other harm as a result of actions YouTube took to suspend or terminate their Frauditor Troll channel in response to multiple takedown notices Mr. Cordova submitted. Dkt. No. 79 at 8. The Court agrees with Mr. Cordova. While defendants have alleged that they suffered harm as a result of “the copyright strikes,” see, e.g., Dkt. No. 58 ¶ 32, they have not plausibly alleged any connection between that harm and any specific misrepresentation by Mr. Cordova.

In denying the second claim she wrote:

The Court also is not persuaded by defendants’ argument that they have adequately pled the terms of an express or implied license. In their opposition, defendants argue that YouTube’s terms of service contain an express license that authorized their use of Mr. Cordova’s videos. Dkt. No. 79 at 6, 9. In addition, defendants argue that the “totality of the parties’ conduct” gave rise to an implied license. Id. at 10. Defendants did not plead any license theory based on YouTube’s terms of service and the Court will not consider it here. See, e.g., Tietsworth v. Sears, 720 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1145 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“It is axiomatic that the complaint may not be amended by briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.” (citation omitted)). In any event, the second counterclaim does not plausibly allege the existence of an implied license based on the “totality of the parties’ conduct.” See Dkt. No. 79 at 7 (citing Dkt. No. 58 ¶¶ 41-45). Defendants’ implied license theory is based solely on allegations that Mr. Cordova made conciliatory remarks to defendant Mr. Huneault during an interview that referenced no specific copyrighted works, sent other videos (not the copyrighted works at issue) to defendants, and participated in defendants’ “livestream” programming. Such allegations do not plausibly support defendants’ claim that they enjoyed an implied license to use all of Mr. Cordova’s copyright works or any specific copyright work or that Mr. Cordova intended to provide such a license. See, e.g., Asset Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748, 754-57 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing elements of implied license).

For these reasons, the Court concludes that defendants’ second counterclaim fails to plead the existence of a “case or controversy” as to any specific works or videos, and fails to state a claim for declaratory judgment.

Judge DeMarchi has given Hudon-Huneault until April 22, 2026, to file amended counterclaims. She placed no such time limit on Cordova’s ability to file a new anti-SLAPP motion.

This is a breaking news story.