A late Friday filing of a motion to dismiss counter claims by That Randall S. “The Unhinged Attorney” Newman, Esq., in the case of Christopher “Denver Metro Audits” Cordova v. Jonathan “Frauditor Troll” Huneault was completely overshadowed by a ruling late in the day by Judge Virginia K. DeMarchi on the merit’s of Huneault’s own motion to dismiss.
DeMarchi’s ruling may have been more significantly helpful to Newman’s counter claims had he not filed a few days before his January 27 deadline.
In her ruling, the judge had significant questions about Huneault’s original fair use arguments before the later revision by Huneault that claimed that he believed that he had a perpetual non-exclusive license to use Cordova’s material based on statements made in a newly discovered livestream in 2022.
That claim by Huneault lies at the heart of both his counter claim against Cordova and his response to Cordova’s second amended complaint.
In his counter claim, Huneault asserted that Cordova was at fault in filing DMCA takedown notices that resulted in the temporary removal of Huneault’s Frauditor Troll channel in 2023. He alleged that Cordova’s actions were in violation of the licensing agreement and willingly and maliciously inflicted damage to Cordova’s channel and his working relationship with advertisers.
Addressing the discovery and the revised take on Huneault’s belief that he had a perpetual license, Newman noted:
“Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unlawfully reproduced, displayed, and monetized portions of his copyrighted videos and brought claims against Defendants for copyright infringement, misrepresentation under § 512(f), circumvention of technological protection measures, and declaratory relief. (FAC ¶¶ 85–123). Defendants deny liability and contend that their videos were authorized and/or protected by fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107. (Answer to FAC, ECF No. 57).
Plaintiff submitted multiple DMCA takedown notices to YouTube in 2023 identifying videos uploaded by Defendants that Plaintiff contended infringed his copyrighted works. (FAC ¶ 58). Defendants responded by submitting DMCA counternotifications pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(g), asserting that the challenged videos were noninfringing and requesting reinstatement of the removed content. (FAC ¶¶ 59–61; Counterclaim ¶¶ 21, 27).
In those counter-notifications, Defendants asserted that their videos were protected by fair use. (FAC ¶ 59). The counter-notifications did not assert that Defendants were authorized by Plaintiff to use the copyrighted works, nor did they claim the existence of any express or implied license. (Id.)”
In her own ruling on Huneault’s motion to dismiss, again, based on Huneault’s first version of his defense, Judge DeMarchi noted that Huneault made a demand of $9,000.00 from Cordova in a letter following the takedown of his channel, and did not mention his belief that the material was licensed in her notation.
Newman continued:
“Defendants’ license theory fails for an additional, independent reason: their own contemporaneous conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with any genuine belief that Plaintiff had granted them authorization, express, implied, or otherwise, to use his copyrighted works.
At every stage where a license or authorization would have been legally relevant, Defendants failed to assert it.
First, in their DMCA counter-notifications submitted to YouTube pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 512(g), Defendants did not claim that they were authorized by Plaintiff to use the copyrighted works. Instead, they asserted that the videos were non-infringing and protected by fair use. (FAC ¶¶ 59–61; Counterclaim ¶¶ 21, 27). The counter-notification process is expressly designed to surface defenses to infringement, including authorization. Defendants’ failure to invoke any license at that stage is telling.
Second, in contemporaneous emails sent by Huneault to Plaintiff on the very day the copyright strikes were issued, Defendants again did not assert that Plaintiff had granted permission or consent. (Counterclaims, Ex. F). Those communications focused on disagreement with Plaintiff’s infringement position, not on the existence of any license. If Defendants genuinely believed they possessed ongoing authorization, one would expect that belief to have been asserted immediately, particularly when facing removal of content. Third, Defendants did not assert authorization or license in the Joint Statement filed with this Court (ECF No. 37). Nor did they do so in their initial motions to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims (ECF Nos. 29, 33). In both instances, Defendants advanced fair use arguments, but conspicuously omitted any claim that Plaintiff had granted them a nonexclusive oral license to copy and monetize his works.
This pattern of omission matters. Under California law, contract formation turns on objective manifestations of assent. Weddington Prods., Inc. at 811. Defendants’ silence when authorization would have been dispositive undermines any claim that the parties shared a contemporaneous understanding that a license existed. A purported license that surfaces only later, after litigation has commenced and only in the form of recharacterized informal remarks, is not evidence of mutual assent; it is evidence of post-hoc reconstruction and fabrication.
Here, Defendants’ course of conduct confirms that their “license” theory is not a belief held at the time of the takedowns, but a litigation-driven reframing introduced only to increase Plaintiff’s litigation costs after realizing their fair use affirmative defense was legally weak. California law does not permit parties to manufacture contractual rights through hindsight, and the Declaratory Judgment Act does not authorize courts to ratify such after-the-fact theories.”
A hearing has been set for Newman’s motion to dismiss the counterclaims on March 3, 2026.
This is a continuing news story.
